Selecting goals and successfully pursuing them in an uncertain and dynamic environment is an 28 important aspect of human behaviour. In order to decide which goal to pursue at what point in time, 29 one has to evaluate the consequences of one's actions over future time steps by forward planning. 30 However, when the goal is still temporally distant, detailed forward planning can be prohibitively 31 costly. One way to select actions at minimal computational costs is to use heuristics. It is an open 32 question how humans mix heuristics with forward planning to balance computational costs with goal 33 reaching performance. To test a hypothesis about dynamic mixing of heuristics with forward 34 planning, we used a novel stochastic sequential two-goal task. Comparing participants' decisions 35 with an optimal full planning agent, we found that at the early stages of goal-reaching sequences, in 36 which both goals are temporally distant and planning complexity is high, on average 42% (SD = 37 19%) of participants' choices deviated from the agent's optimal choices. Only towards the end of the 38 sequence, participant's behaviour converged to near optimal performance. Subsequent model-based 39 analyses showed that participants used heuristic preferences when the goal was temporally distant 40 and switched to forward planning when the goal was close.
participants and test hypotheses, we used stochastic variational inference, which provided posterior 115 beliefs about the goal strategy preference of each participant, among other free model parameters. 116 We show that the heuristic goal strategy preference parameter is key to explain participants' choices 117 when temporally distant from the goal, and how, when progressing towards a goal, this goal strategy 118 preference interacts with optimal forward planning to achieve near-optimal performance. 119 Methods 120 Participants 121 Eighty-nine participants took part in the experiment (58 women, mean age = 24.8, SD = 7.1). 122 Reimbursement was a fixed amount of 8€ or class credit plus a performance-dependent bonus (mean 123 bonus = 3.88€, SD = 13.6). The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Mixed offers A-points in trial t B-points in trial t g1
One-goal-choice = Sequential strategy choice = Choice that maximizes point difference g2
Two-goal-choice = Parallel strategy choice = Choice that minimizes point difference G1 One-goal-success = One point scale above threshold after 15 trials G2 Two-goal-success = Both scales above threshold after 15 trials Q(s,a) Action value = Expected future reward of a choice Q G (s,a)
Goal choice value = Expected future reward of a goal strategy choice DEV Differential expected value = Q G (s, g2) -Q G (s, g1)
Each trial started with a response phase lasting until a response was made, but not more than 3 s ( scale is above threshold (e.g. < 10 and ≥ 10; see below for more details). Rejecting an 163 offer did not have any effect on the current point count. All participants received the same sequence 164 of offers. We generated pseudorandomized lists for the training phase and for the three main 165 experimental phases such that the frequency of offers reflected an equal offer occurrence probability 166 in every list. We associated each offer with a coloured symbol to facilitate fast recognition. 167 Three different conditions modulated the difficulty to reach both thresholds by varying the number of 168 initial points (Fig 1, C) . We chose the number of initial points such that an optimal agent's 169 probability of reaching both thresholds was 75% in easy, 35% in medium and 7% in hard. The 170 agent's goal reaching performance for each initial point configuration was based on 10,000 simulated 171 miniblocks with uniform offer probability (see below how we define the optimal agent). The same 172 sequence of start conditions was presented to all participants. Pseudorandomized lists with a balanced 173 frequency of initial point configurations were generated for the training phase and for the three main 174 experimental phases. Note that the observed agent behaviour in the results section deviates from what 175 we expected based on the experimental parametrization process. These discrepancies arise because 176 we used random offer sequences (offers with equal probability) for experimental parametrization, but points. Using an optimal agent, we chose the number of initial points, such that the agent's 194 probability of reaching both thresholds (G2-success) was 75% in easy, 35% in medium and 7% in 195 hard.
196
Choice classification 197 In order to maximize reward, it was key for the participants to decide whether they should pursue the 198 A-and B-goal in a sequential or in a parallel manner. A parallel strategy, i.e. balancing the two point 199 scales, increases the likelihood that both goals (G2, see Table 1 ) will be reached at the end of the 200 miniblock, but at the risk of failing. A sequential strategy, i.e. first secure one goal, then focus on the 201 second one, might increase the likelihood to reach at least one goal (G1) within 15 trials, but 202 decreases the likelihood to achieve G2.
203
To obtain a trial-wise measure of the pursued goal strategy, choices were classified based on the 204 current point difference and the offer. Choices that minimized the difference between points were 205 classified as two-goal-choice ( = 2), reflecting the intention to fill both bars using a parallel 206 strategy. Choices that maximized the difference between points were classified as one-goal-choice 207 ( = 1), reflecting the intention to pursue G1, or the intention to maintain one bar above threshold 208 if G1-success has already been attained (see S1 Table) . For example, if a participant has 8 A-points 209 and 6 B-points and the current offer is Ab, accepting would be a g1-choice, whereas waiting would 210 be a g2-choice. Conversely, for an aB offer, accepting would be a g2-choice and waiting a g1-choice.
211
If the difference between points ( -) is 1 and the offer is aB, g-choice is not defined 212 because the absolute point difference would not be changed. This also applies to the mirrored case, 213 where the difference between points ( -) is -1 and the offer is Ab. Note that, due to the 214 experimental design, response (accept/wait) and g-choice (g2/g1) were weakly correlated (r = 0.21).
215
Furthermore, g-choice classification is only defined for the mixed offers (Ab and aB). The basic 216 offers (A and B) are not informative with respect to the participants' pursued goal strategy.
217
Importantly, all trial-level analysis will be restricted to trials which can be related to g-choices.
218
Task model 219 Here we will formulate the task in an explicit mathematical form, which will help us clarify what 220 implicit assumptions we make in the behavioural model [19] . We define a miniblock of the two-goal (for ∀ ∈ ) denotes a uniform distribution from which the offers are 236 sampled.
237
 ( | ) denotes the state and trial dependent reward distribution defined as 238 ( = 0 | ) = 1, for ∀ < ( = | ≥ 10 ⊕ ≥ 10) = 1 ( = | ≥ 10 ∧ ≥ 10) = 1 Note that in the experiment the participants are exposed to a pseudo-random sequence of offers, 239 meaning that within one experimental block all participants observed the same sequence of offers 240 pre-sampled from this uniform distribution (see S1-4 Fig. for additional information about the used 241 offer sequence). For simulations and parameter estimates we use the same pseudo-random sequence 242 of observations, hence in each trial of a specific block offers are selected from a predefined 243 sequence 1: 1: = ( 1 1 , … , 1 , … , 1 , … , ), initially generated from a uniform distribution.
244
Behavioural model 245 To build a behavioural model, we assume that participants have learned the task representation In other words, we assumed that the participants might 255 overestimate or underestimate the value of a G2-success, relative to a G1-success.
256
Importantly, the process of action selection corresponds to following a behavioural policy that 257 maximises expected value during a single miniblock. We classified as G2-success miniblocks in 258 which both point scales were above threshold after the final trial ( ≥ 10 and ≥ 10). We 259 classified as G1-success miniblocks in which only one point scale was above threshold (e.g. < 260 10 or ≥ 10).
261
In what follows we derive the process of estimating choice values and subsequent choices based on 262 dynamic programming applied to a finite horizon Markov decision process ([20] ; for experimental 263 studies see also [9, 21] ).
264
Forward Planning 265 We start with a typical assumption used in reinforcement learning, namely that participants choose (5) Note that we use +1: , and : −1 to denote a tuple of sequential variables, hence : = 273 ( , … , ). The key step in deriving the behavioural model was to find the policy which maximises 274 the expected future reward, that is, the expected state-offer value. In practice, one obtains the optimal 275 policy as
We solve the above optimization problem using the backward induction method of dynamic Hence, for a fixed value of the reward ratio ( ) an optimal choice at trial corresponds to 286 * = argmax ( , , )
We will define the optimal agent as an agent who has a correct representation of the reward ratio 287 ( = 1) and does not discount future reward ( = 1). We illustrate in Fig reached; thus, the value of that state is 10 Cents. Similarly, the action that leads to that state has an 295 associated Q-value of 10 Cents. In this example the agent would just have to wait in the last trial (15) 296 to gain a 10 cents reward. Still, planning an arbitrary number of future steps is complex and unrealistic. Hence, we make an 310 assumption that the process of optimal action selection described above is perturbed by noise 311 (planning noise, and response noise) which we quantify in the form of a parameter , denoting 312 response precision. Hence, this precision parameter is critical to characterize the participants' 313 reliance on forward planning. Since the difference in expected future rewards of a g1-or g2-choice 314 is high when the goal is close (S5 Fig) , is able to selectively capture g-choice performance at the 315 end of the miniblock. Furthermore, instead of an elaborate planning process participants might use a 316 simpler heuristic when deciding which action to select. We capture this heuristic in form of an 317 additional offer-state-action function ℎ( , , , ) which evaluates choices relative to possible 318 goals. We describe this heuristic evaluation below. Overall, we can express the response likelihood 319 (the probability that a participant makes choice ) as 320 ( | , , , ) = ( ( , , , , ) + ℎ( , , , )) (8)
where ( ) denotes the softmax function.
321
Choice heuristic 322 The choice heuristic is defined relative to the current offer , current state , and possible choices
323
. Importantly, we will interpret the choice heuristic in terms of participants' biases towards 324 approaching both goals in a sequential or parallel manner. Hence, it is more intuitive to define the 325 choice heuristic as choice biases relative to the goals, and not accept-reject choices. The choice 326 heuristic is defined as follows
where ≡ 2 denotes choices (accept or reject) which can be classified as g2-choices (see 328 subsection Choice classification for details). In summary, a choice which reduces the point difference 329 ( − ), for the given offer and the current state, is classified as g2-choice and choice which 330 increases the point difference as g1-choice. Essentially, the strategy preference parameter reflects 331 participants' preference for pursuing a sequential (negative values) or parallel (positive values) 332 strategy. For example, some participants might have a general tendency to pursue goals in a parallel 333 manner, independent of the actual -values. Conversely, participants may prefer a more cautious 334 sequential approach. Note that we expected this parameter to make the most significant contribution 335 to participants' deviation from optimal behaviour, reflecting their reliance on decision heuristics early 336 in the miniblock.
337
Finally, for those choices which can be classified as g2-or g1-choices, we can express the response 338 likelihood in a simplified form, in terms of free model parameters , , , (Table 2) . We refer to the 339 difference between Q-values for g-choice as the differential expected value ( ),
Using , we defined the probability of making a g2-choice as
where ( ) = 1 1+ − denotes the logistic function. Note that the probability of g1-choice becomes
342
( 1) = 1 − ( 2). Reward ratio 4 = ln 2 − Accounts for the possibility that participants may overweight ( > 1) or underweight ( < 1) the actual reward for G2-success relative to G1-success.
343

346
Optimal agent comparison and general data analysis 347 We compared participant behaviour with simulated behaviour of an optimal agent. To summarize, we 348 denote the optimal agent as the agent which has a correct representation of the reward function 349 ( = 1), does not discount future rewards ( = 1), is not biased in favour of any choice ( = 0), 350 and who generates deterministic g-choices based on -values (corresponding to → ∞ in the 351 response likelihood, that is, the argmax operator). The optimal agent deterministically accepts A and 352 B offers.
353
When simulating agent behaviour to evaluate successful goal reaching, the agent received the same 354 sequence of offers and initial conditions as the participants. Analysis on the level of g-choices was 355 performed by registering instances in which the g-choice of a participant differed from the g-choice 356 the optimal agent would have made in the same context ( , , , ). Trials with A or B offers 357 and trials in which G2 had already been reached, were excluded from the g-choice analysis.
358
The goal of this comparison between summary measures of both optimal agent and participants was 359 two-fold: First, we used this comparison to visualize deviations from optimality and motivate the 360 model-based analysis which was used to test the hypothesis that a shift from heuristics to forward 361 planning may explain these deviations. Second, plotting suboptimal g-choices instead of g-choices 362 ( Fig. 4 ) makes behaviour between participants more comparable. Plotting the proportion of g-choices 363 averaged across participants would have been mostly uninformative because the significance of a g-364 choice depends on the current state, which is a consequence of the individual history of past choices 365 within a miniblock. By registering deviations from an optimal reference point, we circumvent this 366 state dependence of g-choices. 367 We used a sign test as implemented in the "sign_test" function of python's "Statsmodels" [22] 368 package to test whether participants total reward and success rates differed significantly from the 369 optimal agent's deterministic performance. We reported the p-value and the m-value = ( (+) − 370 (−))/2, where (+) is the number of values above 0 and (−) is the number of values below 371 and. To test for learning effects (in the main experimental phase), we used mixed effects models as 372 implemented in R [23] with the "lm4" package [24] . Intercepts and slopes were allowed to vary 373 between participants. p-values were obtained using the "lmerTest" package [25] .
374
Hierarchical Bayesian data analysis 375 To estimate the free model parameters ( 
for ∈ [1, … , ], and ∈ [1, . . , ]
where + (0,1) denotes a Half-Cauchy prior with scale = 1, number of parameters, and 385 number of participants. Note that by using this form of a hierarchical prior we make an explicit to the posterior estimates of latent variables = ( 1 , … , 4 , 1 , … , 4 , 1 , … , ). For more details, 391 see supporting information (S1 Notebook).
392
The behavioural model introduced above defines the response likelihood, that is, the probability of where b denotes experimental block, and t a specific trial within the block.
399
To estimate the posterior distribution (per participant) over free model parameters, we applied the 400 following approximation to the true posterior 401 ( 1 , … , , , | , , ) ≈ ( , ) ∏ ( ) (17)
Note that the approximate posterior captures posterior dependencies between free model parameters 402 (in the true posterior) on both levels of the hierarchy using the multivariate normal and multivariate 403 log-normal distributions. However, for practical reasons, we assume statistical independence between 404 different levels of the hierarchy, and between participants. Independence between participants is 405 justified by the structure of both response likelihood (responses are modelled as independent and 406 identically distributed samples from conditional likelihood) and hierarchical prior (a priori statistical 407 independence between model parameters for each participant).
408
Finally, to find the best approximation of the true posterior given the functional constraints of our 409 approximate posterior, we minimized the variational free energy F[Q] with respect to the parameters 410 of the approximate posterior. among the set of parametric models we tested (S1 Notebook).
420
Results
421
To investigate how the balance between computationally costly forward planning and heuristic 422 preferences changes as a function of temporal distance from the goals, participants performed 423 sequences of actions in a novel sequential decision-making task. The task employed a two-goal 424 setting, where participants had to decide between approaching the two goals in a sequential or in a 425 parallel manner. We first performed a standard behavioural analysis, followed by a model-based 426 approach showing that participants use a mixture of strategy preference and forward planning to 427 select their action.
428
Standard behavioural analysis 429 We first analysed the general performance of all participants andfor each miniblock and trial -430 compared it to the behaviour of an optimal agent possessing perfect knowledge of the task and 431 performing full forward planning to derive an optimal policy that maximizes total reward. The 432 motivation of this comparison was to detect differences between how the optimal agent and 433 participants perform the task. These differences will motivate our model-based analysis below. To 434 compute and compare optimal vs individual policies, all participants and the agent received exactly 435 the same sequence of offers and start conditions. The difference in total reward between participants 436 and agent was significant (m = -35.5, p < 0.001), where participants earned 388.5 Cents (SD = 13.6) 437 and the agent earned 405 Cents. As expected, both participants and agent earned more money in the 438 easy condition than in the medium condition and least in the hard condition (Fig 3, A, C) . In the easy 439 and medium condition, the agent earned significantly more than the participants (easy: M = 8.7 440 Cents, SD = 8.4, m = -33, p < 0.001; medium: M = 7.2 Cents, SD = 7.0, m = -30, p < 0.001). In the 441 hard condition, the total reward did not differ significantly between the participants and agent, m = 442 0.5, p > 0.99 (Fig 3, E) . These results show that participant performance was generally close to the 443 optimal agent but differed significantly in the easy and medium condition.
444
Next, we analysed participants' goal reaching success and compared it to the optimal agent. There In the hard condition, participants reached G2 in only 1% (SD = 2%) of the miniblocks. Participants 450 failed to reach any goal in 2% (SD = 3%) of the miniblocks in the medium and in 6 % (SD = 5%) of 451 the miniblocks in the hard condition. They never failed in the easy condition (Fig 3, B) . The agent 452 reached G2 in 80% in the easy, in 30% in the medium and in 0% in the hard condition (Fig 3, D) .
453
Note that G2 cannot be reached in all miniblocks. We simulated all possible choice sequences (n = 454 2^15) for a given miniblock and evaluated whether G2 was theoretically possible. According to 455 these simulations, 90% G2 performance can be reached in the easy, 35% in the medium and 5% in 456 the hard condition.
457
When comparing participants' goal reaching success with the agent, we found that, on average, there 458 was a consistent pattern of deviations in the easy and medium conditions (Fig 3, F) . In the easy 459 condition, participants reached G2 on average 9% (SD = 8%) less often than the agent (m = -33, p < 460 0.001), but reached G1 9% (SD = 8%) more often (m = 33, p < 0.001). In the medium condition, 461 participants reached G2 on average 6% (SD = 6%) less often than the agent (m = -26, p < 0.001) but 462 reached G1 4% (SD = 7%) more often (m = 16.5, p < 0.001). While the agent never failed, 463 participants had a 2% (SD = 3%) fail rate (m = 11.5, p < 0.001). In the hard condition, participants 464 reached G2 on average 0.6% (SD = 1.6%) more often than the agent (m = 5.5, p < 0.001). G1 (m = -465 7, p = 0.087) and fail-rate (m = 3.5, p = 0.42) did not differs significantly between participants and 466 agent. In summary, these differences in successful goal reaching between participants and the agent 467 explains the difference in accumulated total reward: Participants obtained less reward than the agent 468 because on average they missed some of the opportunities to reach G2 in the easy and medium 469 condition and sometimes even failed to achieve any goal in the medium and hard condition. 
484
How can these differences in goal-reaching success be explained? To address this, we used the 485 mixed-offer trials to identify which strategy a participant was pursuing in a given trial and compared 486 the strategy choice to what the agent would have done in this trial. We classified strategy choices as 487 evidence either of a parallel or a sequential strategy. With the parallel strategy (g2), participants make 488 choices to pursue both goals in a parallel manner, while with a sequential strategy (g1), participants 489 make choices to reach first a single goal and then the other. We inferred that participants used a g2-490 choice for a specific mixed-offer trial when the difference between the points of the two bars was 491 minimized, while we inferred a g1-choice when the difference between points was maximized (see 492 Methods). We categorized a participant's g2-choice as suboptimal when the optimal agent would 493 have made a g1-choice in a specific trial and vice versa. Fig 4, A-D shows the proportions of 494 suboptimal g-choices in mixed-offer trials. In the easy condition, participants made barely any suboptimal g2-choice (mean = 0%, SD = 0.001%), but 29% (SD = 10%) suboptimal g1-choices ( Fig   496   4 , A). This means that participants, on average, preferred a sequential strategy more often than would 497 have been optimal. In the medium condition participants made on average 6% (SD = 3%) suboptimal 498 g2-choices and 28% (SD = 11%) suboptimal g1-choices. Similar to the easy condition, participants, 499 on average, preferred a sequential strategy where a parallel strategy would have been optimal. In the 500 hard condition, this pattern reversed. Participants made on average 40% (SD = 12%) suboptimal g2-501 choices, relative to the agent, and 11% (SD = 6%) suboptimal g1-choices. Participants' suboptimal g-502 choices were also reflected in goal reaching success. In the easy and medium condition, suboptimal 503 g1-choices, relative to the agent, resulted in a higher proportion of reaching G1, and a lower 504 proportion of reaching G2. In the hard condition, suboptimal g2-choices led to occasional fails and a 505 tiny margin of reaching G2. However, despite suboptimal g2-choices, participants still reached G1 in 506 93% (SD = 6%) of the miniblocks.
507
As the first test of our prediction that participants tend to use more forward planning when 508 temporally proximal to the goal, we analysed suboptimal decisions as a function of trial time. As 509 expected, suboptimal decisions, relative to the agent, decreased over trial time (Fig 4, B) . While in 510 the first trial, 42% (SD = 19%) of participants' g-choices deviated from the agent's g-choices, 511 participant behaviour converged to almost optimal performance towards the end of the miniblock, 512 with only 4% deviating g-choices (SD = 7%). We also simulated a random agent that accepts all In the hard condition, the number of suboptimal g2-choices similarly decreased, but not in the easy 518 and medium condition (Fig 4, C) . The number of suboptimal g1-choices decreased across trials in the 519 easy and medium, but not in hard condition (Fig 4, D) . Note that in easy and the medium conditions, 520 opportunities to make suboptimal g2-choices are generally scarce, because the difference between 521 action values = ( 2) − ( 1) was mostly positive, which means that a g2-choice was 522 mostly optimal. Similarly, in the hard condition, as there was a low number of opportunities to make 523 suboptimal g1-choices, there was no clear decrease in the number of suboptimal g1-choices.
524
Although these findings of diminishing suboptimal choices over the course of miniblocks may be 525 explained by the participants' initial employment of a suboptimal heuristic, there is an alternative 526 explanation because we used an optimal agent, which uses a max operator to select its action: If this 527 agent computes, by using forward planning, a tiny advantage in expected reward of one action over 528 the other, the agent will always choose in a deterministic fashion the action with the slightly higher 529 expected reward. Therefore, at the beginning of the miniblock, where the distance to the final trial is 530 largest, the difference between goal choice values = ( 2) − ( 1) (S5 Fig) is close to 0.
531
The reason for this is that a single g2-choice at the beginning of the miniblock does not increase the 532 probability for G2-success by much. However, when only few trials are left, a single g2-choice might 533 make the difference between winning or losing G2. Since are close to 0 at the initial trials we 534 cannot exclude the possibility yet that participants actually may have used optimal forward planning 535 just like the agent but did not use a max operator. Instead, participants may have sampled an action 536 according to the computed probabilities of each action to reach the greater reward in the final trial.
537
Such a sampling procedure to select actions would also explain the observed pattern of diminishing 538 suboptimal g-choices over the miniblock (Fig. 4 B-C ). To answer the question, whether there is 539 actually evidence that participants use heuristics, when far from the goal, even in the presence of 540 probabilistic action selection of participants, we now turn to a model-based analysis. To infer the contributions of participants' forward planning and heuristic preferences, we conducted a 552 model-based analysis. If we find that participants' strategy preference is smaller or larger than zero, 553 we can conclude that participants indeed used a heuristic component to complement any forward 554 planning. This is especially relevant for choices early in the miniblock as values are typically 555 close to zero. Indeed, when inferring the four parameters for all 89 participants using hierarchical 556 Bayesian inference, we found that participants' g-choices were influenced by a heuristic strategy 557 preference in addition to a forward planning component ( Fig 5, A) . For 74 out of 89 participants, we 558 found that the 90% credibility interval (CI) of the posterior over strategy preference did not include 559 zero. 68 of these participants had a positive strategy preference, meaning they preferred an overall 560 strategy of pursuing both goals in parallel. Six of these participants had a negative strategy 561 preference, meaning they preferred to pursue both goals sequentially. The median group 562 hyperparameter of strategy preference was 0.55 (90% CI = [0.47, 0.63]). For example, a participant 563 with this median strategy preference, in a mixed-offer trial where = 0, would make a g2-choice 564 with 63% probability, whereas a participant without a strategy preference bias, i.e. = 0, would 565 make a g2-choice with 50% probability. After the experiment, we had asked participants whether 566 they used any specific strategies to solve the task and to give a verbal description of the used 567 strategy. Reports reflected three main patterns: Pursuing one goal after the other (sequential strategy), 568 promoting both goals in a balanced way (parallel strategy), and switching between sequential and 569 parallel strategy, depending on context (mixed strategy). Reported strategies are in good qualitative 570 agreement with the estimated strategy preference parameter (S8 Fig) , supporting our interpretation of 571 this parameter. Notably, the task instructions, given to the participants prior to the experiment, did 572 not point to any specific heuristic (S1 Text). Altogether, the non-zero strategy preference in 83% of 573 participants indicates that suboptimal decisions within a miniblock (see Fig 4) are not only caused by 574 probabilistic sampling for action selection, but also by the use of a heuristic strategy preference.
575
As expected, we found that the (see Table 1) when encountering a = 0.5, would make a g2-choice with 69% probability. Increasing by 582 1 would increase g2-choice probability to 79%. We found evidence only for weak discounting of 583 future rewards, as for most participants the inferred discount was close to 1 (median of the inferred 584 discount parameter = 0.984, 90% CI = [0.978, 0.988], Fig 5, C) . We found that some participants 585 used a reward ratio different from the objective value of 1 (CI not containing 1). Twelve participants 586 had a reward ratio greater than 1 and 17 participants had a reward ratio smaller than 1. However, the 587 median group hyperparameter of the inferred reward ratio was close to the objective value of 1 ( = 588 1.05, 90% CI = [0.99, 1.11], Fig 5, D) . A reward ratio of 1.2 means, that participants behaved as if 589 the value of achieving G2 would be 2.4 times the value of achieving G1(when in reality the reward is 590 only double as high). While strategy preference has its greatest influence during the first few trials of 591 a miniblock, the reward ratio has an influence only when forward planning, i.e. changes the , 592 and will therefore affect action selection most during the final trials of a miniblock. In addition, we 593 found only low posterior correlation between the strategy preference and reward ratio parameter, 594 indicating that these two parameters model distinct influences on goal reaching behaviour. Histogram of reward ratio parameter .
602
To show that our model with constant parameters is able to capture a dynamic shift from heuristic 603 decision making to forward planning we conducted two sets of simulations where we systematically 604 varied the response precision β and the strategy preference parameter θ. First, we simulated 605 behaviour where we varied β between 0.25 and 3 with θ, , and sampled from their fitted 606 population mean (S1-2 Movie). S2 Movie, B shows that the higher , the fewer suboptimal g-choices 607 are made towards the end of the miniblock. Second, we simulated behaviour where we varied θ 608 varied between -1 and 1 with , , and sampled from their fitted population mean (S3-4 Movie). S4
Movie, B shows that a change in θ affects the number of suboptimal g-choices made at the beginning 610 but not at the end of the miniblock. These two results support the argument that the θ parameter is 611 able to capture heuristic decision making at the beginning of the miniblock while the parameter is 612 able to capture planning behaviour at the end of the miniblock. The reason for this interaction 613 between parameter effect and trial number is that differential expected value ( ) computed by 614 forward planning is close to zero at the beginning of the miniblock but increases towards the end of 615 the miniblock (S5 Fig). For small , the influence of on choice probability is marginal; 616 therefore, the relative influence of the strategy preference parameter θ is high, and behaviour is 617 explained by using the heuristic. For higher trial numbers, i.e. closer to the end of the miniblock, 618 tend to be high so that the influence of the response precision is high, and the relative 619 influence of θ is low; therefore, towards the end of the miniblock behaviour is explained by forward 620 planning with a shift in between, depending on the dynamics of the . We also implemented a We interpret these results as 625 further evidence that the described constant parameterization is sufficient to describe a hidden shift 626 from using a heuristics to forward planning.
627
Finally, as an additional test of the hypothesis that participants rely more on heuristic preferences 628 when the goal is temporally distant, we conducted a multiple regression analysis (Fig 6, A) . To do 629 this, we divided the data into the first (first 7 trials) and the second half (last 8 trials) of miniblocks, 630 and computed, for each participant the proportion of g2-choices in the mixed-offer trials. We fitted, 631 across participants, these proportions of g2-choices against 6 regressors: strategy preference, 632 precision, discount rate, reward ratio, a dummy variable coding for the first and second miniblock 633 half and interaction between strategy preference and miniblock half. We found a significant 634 interaction between strategy preference and miniblock-half (p < 0.001), demonstrating that strategy 635 preference is more predictive for the proportion of g2-choices in the first half of the miniblock than in 636 the second half. Fig 6, B visualizes the interaction effect showing that the slope of the marginal 637 regression line for the first half of the miniblock is greater than the slope of the marginal regression 638 line for the second half of the miniblock. This finding provides additional evidence that participants 639 rely on heuristic preferences when the goal is temporally far away but use differential expected 640 values ( ) derived by forward planning when the goal is closer. against parameters from the four-parameter model, a dummy variable coding for miniblock-half and significant but small main effect of experiment block ( = 5.4, SE = 0.5, p < 0.001). In a second 675 logistic model the dependent variable was suboptimal goal choice (1 = suboptimal, 0 = optimal) and 676 the predictor was experiment block. The second analysis revealed a significant but small main effect 677 of experiment block on the probability to make a suboptimal g-choice ( = -0.084, SE = 0.02, p < 678 0.001). Furthermore, we fitted the three parameter model ( , , ) separately for experiment blocks.
679
Model comparisons revealed that the experiment block-wise model had lower model evidence 680 compared to the conjoint model (S9 Fig.) .
682
As a final control analysis, we used logistic regression to establish how the absolute difference 683 between A-and B-points affects goal choice as a function of the number of trials remaining in the 684 miniblock. If participants rely on a fixed strategy preference when far from the goal, there should be 685 no effect of absolute score difference on goal choice at the start of miniblocks. In this model the 686 depended variable was goal choice (1 = g2, 0 = g1) and the predictors were absolute score difference
.15]), miniblock-half (1 = trial 1-7, 0 = trial 8-15) and the interaction term 688 absolute score difference*miniblock-half. There was a significant main effect of absolute score 689 difference ( = 0.14, SE = 0.008, p < 0.001) and miniblock-half ( = 0.29, SE = 0.039, p < 0.001).
690
Importantly, the analysis revealed a significant interaction between miniblock-half and absolute score 691 difference ( = -0.2, SE = 0.013, p < 0.001). This means that goal choice was more affected by the 692 absolute score difference in the second half the miniblock compared to the first half. The analysis 693 supports our conclusion that participants relied on a heuristic strategy preference when far from the 694 goal.
695
Discussion 696
In the current study, we investigated how humans change the way they decide what goal to pursue 697 while approaching two potential goals. To emulate real life temporally extended decision making 698 scenarios of goal pursuit, we used a novel sequential decision making task. In this task environment, 699 decisions of participants had deterministic consequences, but the options given to participants on 700 each of the 15 trials were stochastic. This meant that especially during the first few trials, participants 701 could not predict with certainty what goal was achievable. Using model-based analysis of 702 behavioural data we find that most participants, during the initial trials, relied on computationally 703 inexpensive heuristics and switched to forward planning only when closer to the final trial. 704 We inferred the transition from a heuristic action selection to action selection based on forward 705 planning using a model parameter that captured participants' preference for pursuing both goals 706 either in a sequential or parallel manner. This strategy preference had its strongest impact for the first 707 few trials, when participants, due to the stochasticity of future offers, could not predict well which of 708 the two available actions in a mixed trial would enable them to maximize their gain. This can be seen 709 from Eq. 11 where two terms contribute to making a decision: the term containing the differential 710 expected value ( ) and the strategy preference . In our computational model, the is the 711 difference between the expected value of a sequential strategy choice and a parallel strategy choice.
712
The enables the agent to choose actions which maximize the average reward gain in a 713 miniblock (see methods). Critically, this is typically close to 0 in the first few trials, i.e. there is 714 high uncertainty on what action is the best one. In this situation, the strategy preference mostly the computational costs needed to simulate these trajectories. Therefore, full forward planning would 720 be both prohibitively costly and potentially useless when the deadline is far away, rendering simpler 721 heuristics [16] the more appropriate alternative.
722
It is an open question what heuristic participants actually used. In our model, the strategy preference 723 parameter simply quantifies a preference for a parallel or sequential strategy and biases a 724 participant's action selection accordingly. This may mean that participants had a prior expectation 725 whether they are going to reach G2 or just G1. Given this prior, participants could choose their action 726 without any forward planning. In other words, to select an action in a mixed trial, participants simply 727 assumed that they are going to reach, for example, G2. This simplifies action selection tremendously 728 because, under the assumption that G2 will be reached, the optimal action is to use the parallel 729 strategy at all times. To an outside observer, a participant with a strong preference for a parallel 730 strategy may be described as overly optimistic, as this participant would choose g2-choices even if 731 reaching G2 is not very likely, e.g. in the hard condition. Conversely, a participant with a strong 732 preference for a sequential strategy may be described as too cautious, e.g. because that participant 733 chooses one-goal actions in the easy condition (see S12 Fig for two example participants) .
734 Importantly, the difference in total reward between the agent and the participants is only about 5% 735 (see Fig 3, E) . This means that even though participants used a potentially suboptimal strategy 736 preference, the impact on total reward is not that large. This is because, as we have shown, later in [21] to 8 trials [7, 8] per miniblock. The reason why we chose a rather large number of trials is that 746 this effectively precluded the possibility that participants can plan forward and ensure that 747 participants were exposed at least to some initial trials where they had to rely on other information 748 than forward planning. This initial period when participants have to select actions without an accurate 749 estimate of the future consequences of these actions is potentially most interesting for studying meta-750 decisions about how we use heuristics when detailed information about goal reaching probabilities is 751 scarce. It is probably in this period of uncertainty during goal reaching, when internal beliefs and 752 preferences have their strongest influence.
753
The second important feature of our task was that participants had to prioritize between two goals.
754
This is a departure from most sequential decision making tasks, where there is typically a single goal, instances, for each of the three conditions. We plot the proportion of reaching, at the end of a 923 miniblock, a single goal (G1), both goals (G2), or no goal (fail). The random agent achieves fewer 924 G2-successes in easy and medium than the participants but fails more often in medium and hard. The preference parameter. Participants who reported the use of a sequential strategy had lower 944 estimated strategy preference, including the most negative values, than participants who reported the 945 use of a parallel strategy. Participants who reported mixed use of a parallel and sequential strategy 946 had greater strategy preference than the sequential group but lower estimates than the parallel group.
947
The plot shows 80 of 89 participants whose verbal reports matched with one of the three strategy 948 categories. strategy preference participant prefers a sequential strategy leading to suboptimal g1-choices in the 983 easy and medium condition. The participant with a high strategy preference parameter prefers a 984 parallel strategy, resulting in a few suboptimal g1-choices in easy in and medium but a large number
